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Abstract 
 
The aim of this policy brief is to objectively examine pros and cons of FDI as a form of international 
capital movement, analyze the dynamics and structure of FDI in post-Milosevic Serbia, with special 
attention paid to stressing its ambiguous relationship with balance of payments position and overall 
economic growth in the country. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Foreign direct investment is crucially important and -generally speaking- most desirable form of 
international capital inflow/foreign financing in contemporary transition economies. Stricto sensu, FDI 
is defined as the increase in the equity position of a non-resident owner who holds more than 10 
percent of the shares of the firm. It also includes the loans received by the local company from the 
parent foreign owner [Fernandez-Arias-Hausmann, 2000].2  
 
From the host country’s standpoint, apparently obvious benefit of FDI as compared with other forms 
of global capital movement is captured by the fact that FDI provides external financial boost without 
creation of new indebtedness, or at least enables temporal coordination of repatriation outflows (which 
is debt repayment sui generis) and economic growth dynamics on both micro and macro level. Other 
benefits include knowledge, organisational and technology transfer (know-how) to host countries – 
domestic firms and local labour force alike. Provided they are not reduced to effective monopolisation, 
FDI tends to enforce production spillovers and enhance intra-industry competition. If export oriented, 
FDI also brings about balance of payments improvement and easier access to foreign markets, as well 
as more intangible political and economic benefits of greater integration with the world economy.  
 
From an investor’s standpoint, FDI represents the riskiest and most profitable form of international 
financial undertaking which has been widely studied in the recent past.3 The literature differentiates 
between so-called greenfield FDI, which represent external investments in a completely new 
production facility and brownfield (aka greyfield) FDI, which boils down to merger or acquisition of 
the existing production facility in order to revitalise and re-launch existing production facility4. 
                                                     
* This paper is a part of researching project No. 159004, financed by the Ministry of Science and Technological 
Development of Republic of Serbia, named: “The Integration of Serbian Economy into the EU - Planning and 
Financing of Regional and Rural Development and Enterprise Development Policy”. 
1 Assistant Professor, Institute of Economic Sciences, Belgrade. 
2 On a practical level, whatever the share may be, it is supposed to achieve effective control over the company at 
hand. 
3 For a good survey, see for example Navaretti, Vanables et al. (2005). 
4 Demekas et al.(2005). 
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From a different perspective economic theory also identifies another two types of FDI: horizontal and 
vertical FDI. Horizontal FDI (HFDI) is market-seeking investment, aimed primarily at serving 
domestic market in the host country through producing/providing identical or rather similar (basket of) 
goods as at home, when local production is seen as a more efficient way to penetrate certain market 
than exports from the source country.5 Therefore, we expect to see HFDI in industries/countries where 
final goods have high(er) transportation costs and trade protection. Vertical FDI (VFDI) is cost-
minimizing investment, when a multinational corporation chooses to internalise its production process 
by buying or establishing plants upstream or downstream. The location of each link of its production 
chain is intended either to minimize global costs and standard of quality flaws, or to address 
imperatives of just-in-time management. Thus, VFDI is expected to take place particularly between 
countries with different factor endowments and different costs of their engagement. As a result of 
these differences in motivation, a number of host country factors, such as market size, proximity and 
transport costs, trade restrictions, can have strikingly different effects on HFDI and VFDI. However, 
the difference between the two is by no means always a clear-cut case.  
 
Be that as it may, both in theory and even more in policy circles, FDI is typically perceived as the 
“good cholesterol”, proper and thus desirable type of foreign capital inflow, as opposed to short-term 
debt finance representing “bad cholesterol”. That, however, does not have to be entirely true.  
 
The aim of this paper is to objectively examine pros and cons of FDI as a form of international capital 
movement, analyze the dynamics and structure of FDI in post-Milosevic Serbia, with special attention 
paid to stressing its ambiguous relationship with balance of payments position and overall economic 
growth in the country. 
FDI TRANSFUSION IN SERBIA: STYLIZED FACTS 
In spite of high spirits and even greater expectations after democratic changes of October 2000,  FDI 
dynamics in Serbia could be best described as neither spectacular nor disappointing. On one hand, 
within ex-Yugoslavia featuring Albania, throughout the new millennium, Serbia accounts for about 
one third of cumulative inbound FDI in the region, hence at first glance it is impressive that Serbia 
(and Montenegro at the time) managed to attract global FDI percentage of a magnitude almost 4 times 
its GDP share in the world GDP. On the other hand, if we omit gigantic 2006 Telenor investment as 
well as recent recession plummet, inward FDI growth trend in Serbia appears to be fairly modest. Its 
FDI indices are roughly comparable with performances of other Western Balkans economies, but 
inferior to golden age of Central European recipients or Ireland, for instance.6    
 
Table 19.1. FDI indices in Serbia (with one period lagged impact)7 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1.13% 2.83% 6.3% 3.8% 5.27% 6.25% 
Source: Author's calculations 
                                                     
5 HFDI still does not assume the firm fully duplicating all its activities in the host country (split into two 
identical parts)., since some of the firm level assets typically have a public good character and should be 
spread firm-wide [Navaretti-Vanables et al., 2005]. They include know-how, managerial skills, brand 
name and reputation to the very least. 
6 Performance index is a simple ratio of country’s share of the total world FDI and country’s share of total world 
GDP. For more extensive discussion consult (Kostadinov, 2007). Here, however, FDI index is constructed for 
illustrative purposes as a bit more dynamic relationship between the FDIt-1 deployed and the lagged GDPt it is 
supposed to influence, which seems to be a feasible assumption at an infant stage of a small open economy 
like post-Milošević Serbia. Also compare with CDLS (2007) study. 
7 We stopped at onset of global financial crisis, since this lagged relationship might arguably become fairly 
unreliable in 2008 and 2009, or at least not really comparable with the tranquil period. 
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Figure 19.1. Foreign direct investments in Serbia, net, in million € (2001-2009) 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
Composition of capital inflows across industries, however, is more openly unfavourable. Over the past 
five years, service sectors have proven to be the most attractive to international investors. The 
financial intermediation sector recorded the biggest FDI inflow of $ 5,2 billion, with 
telecommunications holding the 2nd place with $3.1 billion, whereas manufacturing sectors ranked 
only 3rd with $2.77 billion. Those FDI seem to be predominantly market-seeking, while somewhat 
hasty privatisation of domestic banking system coupled with disindustrialisation of Serbia left us with 
almost none of the local competitors/suppliers to benefit from technological, organisational and 
knowledge spillovers in certain industries. In the manufacturing sector, FDI has been placed in the 
primary and secondary processing of metals and non-metals, the exploitation of mineral water, food 
processing, breweries and dairy products. Agriculture and agro-industry, sector believed to contain 
relative advantage in (export led) development strategy of the country, received no more than 10% of 
FDI in Serbia so far. During 2010, IKEA is expected to enter the Serbian market, at first as an HFDI in 
five different locations country-wide (3-4 objects, 250-300 mill.€ per location), as well as some new 
HFDI by “Merkur” and “Mr.Bricolage” retailers. 
 
Table 19.2. Inbound FDI across industries in mill US$ (2004-March 2009) 
 
Industry Investment total 
Financial intermediation 5193.4 
Transport and telecommunications 3107.2 
Manufacturing 2773.6 
Real estate 1954.5 
Wholesale, retail, repairs 1909.6 
Mining and quarrying   576.1 
Construction   345.4 
Agriculture   119.2 
Hotels&restaurants     93.2 
Electricity, gas, water     89 
        Source: National Bank of Serbia 
 
In a nutshell, FDI deployed in the Serbian economy can be characterized by the following: buying the 
market rather than buying production capacity, too few green-field inflows still, only about 60% of the 
FDI controlled businesses have any export orientation whatsoever, some of the greatest exporters are 
also the greatest importers (e.g. US Steel), notable market distortions (oligopoly in the wholesale 
distribution and hypermarket chains, in banking, coffee market, milk production, monopoly in the 
production of steel).  
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Leading foreign investors in Serbia that recognized the country’s virtues have usually expressed their 
sympathies summarized in a) the favourable growth prospects (after achieving macroeconomic 
stability propped by relatively good fundamentals), b) skilled labour force and abundant natural 
endowments, c) liberalized foreign trade and attractive location, and interestingly d) good 
understanding of the (Serbian) market.8 
 
 
Table19.3. Leading Foreign Investors in Serbia (2002-2009) 
 
Company Country Industry Investment type Amount  (mill €) 
Telenor Norway Telecommunications Privatisation  
 
1602
Gazprom 
Neft 
Russia Energy Privatisation  
 
  947
Philip Morris USA Tobbaco Privatisation  
 
  611
Mobilkom Austria Telecommunications Greenfield   570
Intesa Sanpaolo 
 
Italy Financial 
intermediation 
Acquisition   508
Stada Germany Pharmaceuticals Acquisition   475
AB InBev  Belgium Food Acquisition   427
NBG Greece Financial 
intermediation 
Privatisation   425
Mercator Slovenia Retail Greenfield   240
Fondiaria SAI Italy Financial 
intermediation 
Privatisation   220
Lukoil Russia Energy Privatisation   210
Airport City BG Israel Real estate Greenfield   200
Block 67 Austria&Serbia Real estate Joint 
venture/Greenfield 
  180
Holcim Switzerland Construction Privatisation   170
OTP Bank Hungary Financial 
intermediation 
Privatisation   166
Carlsberg Dennmark Food Acquisition   152
US Steel USA Manufacturing Privatisation   150
METRO Germany Wholesale Greenfield   150
Coca-Colla USA Food  Acquisition   142
Lafarge France Construction Privatisation   141
Droga Kolinska Slovenia Food Greenfield   100
Source: SIEPA 
 
 
However, most common complaints (or indeed barriers for potential investors that opted to stay out of 
Serbia after all) which could be identified in both academic (analysts) and business (foreign investors) 
community in Serbia are: 1) Bureaucracy/Corruption, 2) Lack of property rights enforcement, 3) Poor 
Infrastructure and 4) Political Risk.9 
                                                     
8 See also Domarchi and Nkengapa (2007), as well as Strategic Marketing-USAID (2008). 
9 See Strategic Marketing-USAID (2008) study of 119 foreign investors in Serbia, but also Barolli et alia (2007). 
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ARE WE GETTING THE BLOOD TYPE THAT WE NEED? 
This last section of the paper deals with several widespread misconceptions about FDI among the 
policymakers/politicians not only in Serbia, but  in transition countries by and large. In my opinion, 
lack of understanding of the nature, determinants and effects of foreign capital inflows is one of the 
principal «culprits» behind suboptimal growth performance and deepening external disequilibrium in 
Republic of Serbia. 
 
First set of misconceptions, let us dub it external-equilibrium-myth, has to do with tricky relationship 
between country's balance of payments (external economic position) and inbound FDI.  On numerous 
occasions, Serbian top officials asserted in media 'that the only way to overturn such a huge balance of 
payments deficit and enable growth and prosperity is to attract as much FDI as possible'. Early 
enough, the statement won the overwhelming aura of indisputable truth in the Serbian public, among 
the policymakers and in academia alike. However, on a scale between being an axiom and being 
patently wrong, this expression is dangerously close to the latter! If the country turns to be successful 
in attracting massive sums of FDI, its short-to-medium term BoP shall certainly deteriorate, not 
improve!10 On the other hand, its long-term BoP position might recuperate only under half a dozen of 
«if-s» and «caeteri paribi». But, prior to exploring those long-run prerequisites for FDI-led surplus 
and growth, one must ask what are the intellectual seeds of this FDI vs. BoP misconception?  
 
One is erroneous Lawson's doctrine: Serbian authorities  made clear in several instances in last couple 
of years that they consider ‘trade deficit to be sustainable for as long as Serbia manages to cover it 
through remittances and FDI, moreover, for as long as Serbia’s foreign exchange reserves are 
mounting’. ‘There is no such thing as a free lunch’, of course, moreover, every serious regional 
political instability or global financial crisis could evidently endanger the long-term stability of foreign 
capital inflows, i.e. the long-term solvency of the country. In addition, private investors’/consumers’ 
behaviour is not always rational in the short to medium run, since lots of capital inflows in Serbia have 
been currently consumed rather than invested, therefore some of the net FDI inflows might be actually 
postponing necessary reforms and enlarging their eventual scale!11  
 
The other intellectual sophism behind the external equilibrium myth is the belief that capital 
transfusion is the cure for every economic condition in transition countries and that, furthermore, 
every “blood type” of FDI will do. Closely intertwined, as it happens, is still deeply-rooted legacy of 
in fact long-disavowed Harrod-Domar growth model, according to which economic growth ought to 
be proportional to the share of capital investment in the country’s GDP.12 Finally, the last pitfall within 
the external-equilibrium-myth is dogma about FDI not creating an external liability at all. As a matter 
of fact, all of the above statements are false! Blood type matters, and than some, since potentially re-
confiscated capital flight from Serbia in 1990’s and investment by Serbian “Gastarbeiter” and 
diaspora, for instance, would not constitute external liabilities and therefore could alleviate external 
financing gap. Similarly, privatisation-induced FDI and autonomous, “underlying” FDI inflows often 
have completely different determinants and investor’s logic that drives their existence [Demekas et al., 
2005]. In addition, Easterly and Levine (2001) rejected the Harrod-Domar hypothesis by asserting that 
physical capital is relatively unimportant in explaining long run growth, since most of the cross-
country differences in growth were due to technical progress. Worse still, identity between FDI 
receipts (cashed in by the state) and capital investment is far from secured. Moreover, if not reinvested 
via retained earnings, dividend (re)payments to foreign investors are unavoidable capital outflows 
which debit the current account, while previous corresponding FDI inflows are often  less generous 
                                                     
10 Since the current account equals the difference between national accumulation and overall investments 
committed in the economy, B=S-I, so long as we need net capital inflows from abroad we shall unavoidably 
accumulate BoP deficits [Malović, 2008]. 
11 For in depth analysis of the issue, consult Malović (2008). 
12 For more on this, see Easterly (2001, Ch.2). 
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than it originally looks. Namely, opportunistic and myopic governments proved capable of switching 
from granting subsidies to loss-making state enterprises to guaranteeing bank loans/tax rebates etc. for 
new foreign “investor”, thereby creating the appearance of a deficit reduction.13 Thus, FDI may be 
heavily leveraged domestically and/or also swiftly resold (in part or entirely) to domestic savers, in 
which case the resulting net capital transfusion is substantially smaller than the initial gross amount 
recorded as proud and precious FDI inflow in BoP statistics [Razin-Sadka, 2001]. 
 
The second set of misconceptions about FDI, let us dub it the exogenous-growth-myth, stems from the 
ambiguous relationship between FDI, financial development and economic growth. FDI is primarily 
considered as more stable, bolted down form of foreign financing, since -unlike portfolio investment- 
it allegedly cannot leave so easily at the first sign of trouble. On a top of that, it is widely believed in 
transition countries (Serbia very much included) that FDI brings about economic growth! In theory, 
indeed, FDI brings in advanced technology that leads to increasing returns in domestic production and 
increases the value-added content of FDI-related production. The greatest and longer-term impact of 
FDI is that of spillovers which occurs when the advanced technology from FDI is able to trickle down 
to the entire economy [Domarchi-Nkengapa, 2007, p. 8]. Here, crucial is the fact that the effect of FDI 
on economic growth depends on whether FDI is complementing or substituting domestic investment! 
In many host sectors in Serbia FDIs were substituting vanishing domestic production or simply 
abstaining from larger scale engagement of local firms as subcontractors.14 Nevertheless, as pointed 
out earlier, privatisation-induced FDI and autonomous, “underlying” FDI inflows typically have 
different determinants and investor’s logic that drives their existence. Privatisation-induced FDIs are 
swift-profit-seeking undertakings that typically engage in M&A’s towards ready-made facilities that 
do not rely upon broader economic infrastructure, agglomeration effects (presence of other foreign or 
capable domestic firms and supporting businesses) and do not require grand recapitalisation or 
exhausting lags between investment and proper return [Malović-Petrović, 2009]. Such investments in 
Serbia too were almost exclusively of horizontal breed and thus are arguably also perceived as easier 
to resell (than vertical ones) in the face of adversity. Therefore, some of the inward FDI in Serbia were 
not meant to or unable to spillover onto the rest of economy, while great deal of it aimed at ready-
made sectors/businesses which could be abandoned (resold with discount) if push comes to shove.  
 
In other words, if you want to attract more serious FDI and quantities of capital that “mean business”, 
you’ve got to have robust growth underway already, rather than vice versa! This proposition, hitherto 
verified with the benefit of hindsight, that it is not large inflows of FDI that cause high growth rates, 
but strong growth that acts as a magnet for the “underlying” FDI, has been profoundly ignored in 
Serbian public discourse and economic policy-making thus far.  
 
Finally, it is fair to say that there are some independent limitations for FDI transfusion in Serbia. 
Admittedly, Serbia is running a decade late through its transition process, hence many North-South 
FDI flows were already deployed by the time Serbia opened up for foreign investors. Also, prevalence 
of FDI flows in initial phases of transition is not necessarily a sign of good economic and financial 
health.15 In more mature stages of transition, however, broader financial development is expected to 
excel in order to propel national R&D, human capital and technology upgrades in local firms, 
compulsory for spillover effects of the “underlying” FDI to gain momentum across the Serbian 
economy.  
 
 
                                                     
13 For more on this see Easterly (2001, Ch.6) Usually, there was some kind of round-tripping operation or clear-
cut corruption behind such a staged scene. 
14 Often because -in terms of know-how, standards of safety/quality, technology and human capital- Serbian 
enterprises honestly couldn’t deliver. 
15 Fernandes-Arias and Hausmann (2000) in their famous empirical study found that he share of FDI in total 
flows tends to be larger in countries that are riskier, more distant, resource rich, financially underdeveloped, 
institutionally weak and suffering from original sin. 
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